Endogenous Policy Announcement and Accountability for Inflation Target by Morimoto, Keiichi
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Endogenous Policy Announcement and 
Accountability for Inflation Target 
 
 
Keiichi Morimoto 
 
 
Discussion Paper 09-06 
Endogenous Policy Announcement and
Accountability for Inflation Target
Keiichi Morimoto∗
February, 2009
Abstract
In this paper, I show that accountability for inflation target will improve so-
cial welfare when the central bank makes transparency-opaqueness choices endoge-
nously. The key elements are uncertainty of the firms’ informational quality, the
opacity bias of constrained discretionay monetary policy under noisy information,
and the role of harmful noisy public information. Based on the qualitative and
quantitative result, I present a policy recommendation as to policy announcements
and inflation targeting regime.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the role of information in monetary policy analysis has been one of the
most important issues in monetary economics. The problems about the ambiguous effects
of transparency on social welfare have been focused. For example, see Morris and Shin
(2002).
In this paper, I show that accountability for inflation target will improve social welfare
when the central bank makes the transparent-opaqueness choice endogenously. Among
the five kind of transparency classified by Geraats (2002), I focus on economic trans-
parency. I explore the relationship between the central bank’s announcement under
noisy information and social welfare, how the central bank decides to make policy an-
nouncements and the design of the mechanism to implement the announcement actions.
The problem of endogenous regime choice by the central bank has not been argured
yet. In the literature, using a traditional Phillips curve, Faust and Svensson (2002) an-
alyze endogenous (continuous) choice of degree of control and transparency under both
commitment and discretion. They emphasizes the importance of commitment mech-
anisms and policy objectives in treating central bank transparency. The meaning of
transparency in the model of Faust and Svensson (2002) is not a provision of the central
bank’s forecast of future economic developmets.
In the model of this paper, transparency means that the central bank gives announce-
ments on its outlook for future economic shocks. Opaqueness means that the central bank
makes no announcements on its information. Since whether the central bank announce
its information to the public can be thought as a classification criterion of monetary pol-
icy regimes, the decision-makings about transparecy or opaqueness is a kind of monetary
policy regime choices. Another feature of my analysis is that the central bank’s choice is
discrete. There are only two alternatives, transparency and opaqueness. This generates
difficulty of the central bank’s approapriate decision-making because failure in judgement
generated by imperfect information would tend to bring larger losses than in continuous
choice cases. I treats the problem in this paper.
Section 2 describes the basic model with exogenous policy announcement. Section 3
1
quickly reviews the basic model’s welfare implications which is necessary to understand
the main result of this paper. Section 4 presents the main result of the relationship
between the endogenous policy announcements and accountability for inflation target.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
I use the model of Walsh (2007b) and Walsh (2008). I abstract from Morris and Shin’s
(2002) informational heterogeneity of firms in the base model since that is not an impor-
tant assumption for the main result of this paper.
There are a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms. Their price-setting behavior
is characterized by Calvo-type staggered pricing, which introduces nominal rigidity to the
model. Each firm and the central bank receive private signals on the fundamental shocks.
I assume that each firm’s signal is identical, so that, there is informational asymmetry
only between the private sector and the central bank.
2.1 Timing and Infomational Structure
In the model economy there are the three fundamental shocks; cost, demand and welfare
gap shocks, denoted by u, v, w respectively. I assume that the central bank’s policy
instrument is the intended next-period output gap.
The timing is as follows:
1. To begin with, the central bank chooses between the transparent regime and the
opaque regime. The transparent (opaque) regime is one in which the central bank
makes (no) announcements on its forecast of future economic shocks. The difference
of the model of this paper and Walsh (2008) is this dicision-making of the central
bank.
2. At the end of period t − 1, the central bank receives its signals on the shocks in
period t and sets the value of its policy instrument.
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3. The private sector receives the signals on the shocks in period t and the value of
policy instrument the central bank set.
4. The firms which can adjust their price set prices in period t.
5. At the beginning of period t, the three shocks are realized and then the inflation
rate and output gap in period t are determined.
At the end of period t− 1, each firm receives the signals, uft , vft , wft , on the shocks in
period t in the following form.
uft = ut + ε
f
u,t,
vft = vt + ε
f
v,t,
wft = wt + ε
f
w,t,
where ut, vt and wt are the realization of the shocks in period t, and ε
f
u,t and ε
f
v,t are the
firms’ measurement errors.
In the same way, the central bank receives signals on the three shocks by
ucbt = ut + ε
cb
u,t, (1)
vcbt = vt + ε
cb
v,t, (2)
wcbt = wt + ε
cb
w,t. (3)
I assume that all shocks and measurement errors are independent and serially uncorre-
lated and follow the normal distribution with mean zero.
The key elements of the informational structure are
γfs =
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
f,s
, γcbs =
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
cb,s
(s = u, v, w),
where σ2s is the variace of shock st and σ
2
f,s and σ
2
cb,s are the variance of ε
f
s,t and ε
cb
s,t
respectively. The noise ratios above are the measure of quality of the firms’ and the
central bank’s information on the future economic shocks. For example, when γcbu is high,
the central bank has precise outlook for future cost shock. If γcbs = 1, then the central
bank’s information on shock s is perfect and if γcbs < 1 , then it is imperfect.
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In the line of rational expectations, I assume that the private sector knows γcbs (s =
u, v, w). Thus, since the central bank’s forecast of the shock s is given by (see (1),(2),(3))1
Ecbt−1st = γ
cb
s s
cb
t ,
the private sector is able to observe the central bank’s forcasts if the central bank reveals
its signals. Therefore, the transparent regime of monetary policy is one in which the
central bank announces its signals to the private sector.
2.2 Supply and Demand Sides
As in Walsh (2007a), by the standard assumption of Calvo-pricing and monopolistic
competition, the AS relation (supply side) of the model is represented by the following
New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
pit = βE
f
t−1pit+1 +
(1− ω)(1− βω)
ω
(κEft−1xt + E
f
t−1ut), (4)
where pit and xt are inflation rate and output gap in period t and the parameter β, ω
and κ represents the discount factor, the probability which each firm can not adjust its
price and the elasticity of inflation with respect to output gap respectively. For details,
see Appendix.
I specify the AD relation (demand side) by
xt = θt−1 + vt, (5)
where θt−1 is the central bank’s policy instrument in period t − 1 (the intended output
gap).
2.3 Monetary Policy Objectives
To measure social welfare, I adopt the standard social loss function such that
L =
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[pi2t + λ(xt − wt)2], (6)
1Ecbt−1st means the expectation of shock st based on the centrtal bank’s information in period t− 1.
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where the parameter λ represents the social preference relation between inflation and
output gap.
When the monetary policy regime is inflation targeting, the central bank is account-
able for the inflation target to some extent. Thus, as in Walsh (2003), I set the loss
function of the central banker to
Lcb =
1
2
Ecb0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
pi2t + λ(xt − wt)2 + τ(pit − piT )2
]
, (7)
where piT is the (non-state-contingent) target value of inflation rate and the parameter
τ ≥ 0 is the degree of accountability for the target. Since there is no average inflation
bias in this model, the appropriate inflation target is zero. Hence, by (5), the central
bank’s loss function is reduced to
Lcb =
1
2
Ecb0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1 + τ)pi2t + λ(xt − wt)2
]
. (8)
3 Opaque and Transparent Regimes
The qualitative welfare implication of the opaque and transparent monetary policy is
similar to Walsh (2008) but I quickly review them for convienience to understand the
background of the results in the next section.
3.1 Opaque Regime and Optimal Degree of Accountability
In opaque regimes, the central bank does not announce the signals it receives, Ωcbt =
[ucbt , v
cb
t , w
cb
t ]
′. Thus, the private sector will set their optimal prices by infering the central
bank’s information Ωcbt through the revealed value of the policy instrument θt−1.
Let Ωft = [u
f
t , v
f
t , w
f
t ]
′. Then, each firm’s information vector in period t − 1 is
[Ωft , θt−1]
′. By using the method of minimal state variables, the equilibrium pricing
strategy will be of the form such as
pi∗t = A
oΩft +B
oθt−1, (9)
5
Table 1: Optimal Policy Responses in the opaque regime ( σ2u = σ
2
v = σ
2
w = 1 )
γcbs γ
f
s piθ E
cbu Ecbv Ecbw
∗ 1 0.474 -0.452 -1.000 0.3634
0.4 0.4 0.122 -0.126 -1.017 0.8621
0.8 0.265 -0.301 -1.024 0.5022
0.8 0.4 0.043 -0.058 -1.006 0.9421
0.8 0.162 -0.279 -1.011 0.6439
where Ao is 1 × 3 and Bo is 1 × 1.2 Aggregate inflation rate is
pit = (1− ω)pi∗t = (1− ω)(AoΩft +Boθt−1).
The reponse of the inflation rate to the policy instrument is
piθ ≡ ∂pit
∂θt−1
=
(1− ω)(1− βω)
ω
κ(1 + CoEfSθ),
where Co is 1 × 3 and EfSθ is impact which observing θt−1 has on firms’ expectation of
the vector of fundamental shocks, St ≡ [ut, vt, wt]′. 3 The first and second term in the
bracketed part of the right-hand side of (12) are the direct effect and the informational
effect on inflation. Note that if piθ is high, then given a degree of inflation volatility, the
central bank can make output gap volatility small.
In the following analysis, I specify the value of parameters. 4 The baseline values of
parameters are as follow: β = 0.99, ω = 0.75, κ = 1.8, λ = 0.0625, σ2u = σ
2
v = 1. I set
σ2w = 0.001 to make the model close to the standard model in which there are no welfare
gap shocks.
The key findings in Table 1 are the next two points. First, given γcbs , piθ is increasing in
γfs . In the opaque regime, under imperfect information (γ
f
s < 1), θ conveys information
2pi∗t = p∗t − pt−1. p∗t is the optimal price of each firm which can adjust their prices and pt is aggregate
(log) price level.
3The concrete definition of EfSθ lies in the appendix.
4These values are consistent with standard New Keynesian models. See Walsh (2008).
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Table 2: Optimal Accountability in the opaque regime = τ ∗o ( σ
2
u = σ
2
v = σ
2
w = 1 )
γcbs γ
f
s τ
∗
o
0.4 0.4 3.34
0.6 1.86
0.8 0.67
1 0
0.8 0.4 4.76
0.6 3.98
0.8 1.63
1 0
on the central bank’s forecast to the private sector. A rise in θ lowers the firms’ forecasts
of demand shocks and also reduces their forcasts of cost shocks, so that the expected
inflation decreases. Second, imperfect information reduces the optimal policy responses
to the central bank’s signals on the cost and demand shock. This is the immediate result
of the first point.
The second point above suggests that positive degree of accountability for inflation
target is optimal. The reason is that it makes the central bank stabilize inflation volatility
in the face of cost shocks and this means monetary policy is closer to the perfect infor-
mation case. In fact, Table 2 supports such a conjecture. Note that given the quality
of the central bank’s information, the optimal degree decreases with the quality of the
private sector’s information. A rise in γfs reduces inefficient informational effect which
the policy instrument makes. Note also that in the perfect information case, there is no
inefficient informational effect and so the optimal degree of accountability is zero.
3.2 Transparent Regime
In a transparent regime, the central bank announces its signals on the fundamental shocks.
Thus, the information vector of the firms in period t − 1 is [Ωft ,Ωcbt , θt−1]. Hence, the
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firms’ equilibrium pricing strategy is of the form such as
pi∗t = A
tΩft +D
tΩcbt +B
tθt−1,
At and Dt are 1 × 3 and Bt is 1 × 1. As shown in Appendix,
piθ =
∂pit
∂θt−1
=
(1− ω)(1− βω)
ω
κ,
which suggests that there is no informational effect of the policy instrument in the trans-
parent regime. Therefore, the optimal degree of accountability for inflation target is zero
whatever the values of noise ratios are. That is, Rogoff’s (1985) conservative central
banker reduces social loss under imperfect information. In this model, the cost shocks
are serially uncorrelated. Hence, without any infomation effect, there is no reason to
consider the positive degree of accountability. See Clarida et al.(1999)
3.3 Transparency versus Opaqueness
Figure 1 presents welfare comparison between the transparent and opaque regime with
the optimal degree of accountability. The key parameters are γcbu and γ
f
s . The intuition is
clear. If γf is large, then the quality of the central bank’s information on demand shock is
high. Thus, the central bank can set the policy instrument and the gain of transparency
dominates that of opaqueness.
4 Endogenous Policy Announcement and Account-
ability
This section is the main body of the paper. In the last section, it is exogenous whether
the central bank announces its forecast for the future economic development. In this
section, I will endogenize the central bank’s choice between the transparent and opaque
regime. I call it transparent-opaqueness choice. Since I assume that the monetary policy
regime is constrained discretion, the central bank have to make transparency-opaqueness
choices before it actually conducts monetary policy and commits it through the future. 5
5See King (2002).
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The simulation result of the last section suggests that a key element to determine which
of transparent and opaque regime is desirable is the quality of the firm’s information, γfs .
4.1 Endogenous Policy Announcement
I add the following assumptions. The central bank chooses whether to announce to the
public its information of the future economic development. Before the decision-making
above, the central bank receives signal γ˜fs on γ
f
s . The signal γ˜
f
s is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on the interval [γfs −as, γfs +as], where as is a positive parameter. It considers
both the opaque and transparent regimes. About the opaque regime, given a degree τ of
the accountability for inflation target, it anticipates the coefficients A,B of the private
sector’s response such that
pit = (1− ω)(AΩft +Bθt−1),
its own response coefficient Θ such that θt−1 = ΘΓcbΩcbt and equilibrium dynamics of the
model economy, and then estimates expected value of its loss function Lcb in the opaque
regime. The case of the transparent regime is analogously calculated. 6The transparent
regime is chosen if the expected value is smaller in transparent regime than in the opaque
regime.
With large measurement error of the quality of the firms’ information, |γfs − γ˜fs |, the
central bank might make a mistake on TOCs and leads catastrophic social loss. Since re-
sults of transparency-opaqueness choices crucially depend on the degree of accountability
for the inflation target, I explore the role of accountability for beneficial implementation
of transparency-opaqueness choices. In general, if τ is small, then the central bank will
be tend to choice transparent regime. However, this does not necessarily improve so-
cial welfare since the opaque regime is desirable when γfs is low. Thus, there is room
to optimize the expected social welfare with respect to τ with the quality of the firms’
information given.
6In the transparent regime, the private sector’s response is of the form such as pit = (1 − ω)(AΩft +
DΩcbt +Bθt−1).
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I formulate this problem. Before the beginning of the period 0, the central bank
receive the signal
γ˜fs ∼ U([γfs − as, γfs + as]), s = u, v, w.
The central bank chooses between the transparent and opaque regime to minimize its
loss function subject to that it must subsequently conduct monetary policy under the
constrained discretionary regime it chooses. That is, the behavior of the central bank is
min
i∈{0,1}
1
2
Ecb0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1 + τ)pi2t (i, τ) + λ(xt(i, τ)− wt)2
]
,
where 0 and 1 indicate the transparent and opaque regime respectively and {pit(i, τ), xt(i, τ)}∞t=0
is equilibrium dynamics of the model when the degree of accountability for the inflation
target is τ and the central bank chooses regime i. Because the central bank chooses either
transparent regime or opaque regime, the choice can be represented by a function
C : (γ˜fu , γ˜
f
v , γ˜
f
w, τ) 7→ {0, 1},
Once the central bank makes a transparency-opaqueness choice, the monetary policy
regime is determined and optimal monetary policy is conducted under the regime. Even-
tually, given the actual firms’ infomational quality, the social loss L depends on the result
of the transparency-opaqueness choice, which is given by a function
L( · |γfu , γfv , γfw) : {0, 1} → R.
Thus, the optimal degree τ ∗∗ of accountability for inflation target is written by
τ ∗∗(γfu , γ
f
v , γ
f
w) ∈ argmin
τ≥0
E
[
L
(
C(γ˜fu , γ˜
f
v , γ˜
f
w, τ)
∣∣∣γfu , γfv , γfw)],
where γ˜fs ∼ U([γfs − as, γfs + as]), s = u, v, w.
For simplicity, I consider the case where γfu = γ
f
v = γ
f
w(= γ
f ) and au = av = aw(= a).
Hence, the expectations will be taken with repect to γ˜f ∼ U([γf − a, γf + a]). For
numerical calculation, I set the baseline values such that a = 0.2, γcbu = γ
cb
v = γ
cb
w = 0.8.
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Figure 2 shows the simulation result. It is intuitively plausible. When the firms’
informational noise is strong (γf ≤ γ0), τ ∗∗ is identical to τ ∗, the optimal degree of
accountability without parameter uncertainty for the central bank. In this case, τ ∗ is
large and so the central bank will definitely choose the opaque regime if the optimal
accountability τ ∗ is assigned since monetary policy under transparent regime is intensely
distorted by strong accountability τ ∗. 7
When γ0 < γ
f < γ1, τ
∗∗ > τ ∗. Since τ ∗ is somewhat small, under τ ∗, there is
possibility that the central bank chooses the transparent regime. The quality of the
private sector’s information is not high, so that the private sector’s response to noise
of the central bank information is sensitive. Accountability for inflation target helps to
make the cetnral bank choose the transparent regime. Intuitively, it is optimal to escape
loss of inflation volatility under the transparent regime stochastically by imposing strong
accountability for inflation target on the central bank when it might fail in transparency-
opaqueness choices since announcing inaccurate information generates crucial social loss.
When γf > γ1, τ
∗∗ = τ ∗ again. Since τ = 0 brings large opacity bias under opaque
regime, assigning it makes the central bank choose the transparent regime definitely.
To summerize, the policy implication of the analysis above is:
Result 1
Assume that welfare gap shocks are very small (i.e. σw ≈ 0). If the central bank makes
transparency-opaqueness choices and there is uncertfuture economic developments, then
it is optimal to impose higher (or equal) degaincy about the central bank’s information
on the quality of firms’ outlook for ree of accountability for inflation target on the central
banker than in the case of certainty.
By Figure 1, the optimal degree of accountability for inflation target jumps at γ1,
which is the threshold of welfare comparison between transparency and opaqueness un-
der certainty about the firms’ informational quality. This is a difficulty of the suboptimal
implementation of transparency-opaqueness choices. Discreteness of announcement pol-
icy regimes generate the problem.
7Note that the optimal degree of accountability under transparent regime is 0 independent of noise
ratios γ.
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5 Conclusion
Transparency does not necessarily improve social welfare. This fact plays a significant
role in the design of an optimal monetary policy regime. In this paper, I show that
accountability for the inflation target can exclude harmful central bank transparency
which confuses the private sector.
There are two remaining problems. First, another process of the central bank’s
transparency-opaqueness choices should be considered. In the model, the central bank is
assumed to make transparency-opaqueness choices according only to its anticipation of
the private sector’s response. Second, the central bank makes transparency-opaqueness
choices when it conducts commitment policy. Under commitment, the opacity bias will
disappear but the loss generated from noisy central bank’s informaiton will not and so it
is meaningful to investigate how to implement the suboptimal transparency-opaqueness
choices.
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Appendix
Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
In the standard assumption of the Calvo-pricing, firm j’s price adjustment strategy is
p∗j,t = (1− βω)
∞∑
s=0
(βω)s
(
Ejt−1MCt+s + E
j
t−1pt+s + E
j
t−1u
j
t+s
)
,
where MCt+s denotes nominal marginal cost in period t+ s. By this equation, we obtain
p∗j,t = (1− βω)
(
Ejt−1pt + E
j
t−1MCt + E
j
t−1ut
)
+ βωEjt−1p
∗
j,t+1. (10)
Aggregate price level in period t is given by
pt = (1− ω)p∗t + ωpt−1,
which implies
pit = pt − pt−1 = 1− ω
ω
(p∗t − pt), (11)
where p∗t is the average of p
∗
j,t over price-adjusting firm j. Since all firms are symmetric
in this model, p∗j,t = p
∗
t . Assuming MCt = κxt, from (17) and (18),
pi∗t =
1− βω
ω
κEft−1xt +
1− βω
ω
Eft−1ut +
β
1− ωE
f
t−1pit+1. (12)
Hence, from (17) and (19), I obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Solving the Model under Opaque Regime
Assume that the private sector’s belief about monetary policy is
θt−1 = ΘoΓcbΩcbt , (13)
where Θ is 1× 3 undetermined coefficient and
Γcb =
 γcbu 0 00 γcbv 0
0 0 γcbw
 .
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The private sector’s expectation of the aggregate shock vector St = (ut, vt, wt) and the
firms price-adjustment strategy are of the forms such as
Eft−1St = Ψ
0
1Ω
f
t +Ψ
o
2θt−1, (14)
pi∗t = A
oΩft +B
oθt−1. (15)
Since Eft−1pit+1 = 0 by pit = (1− ω)pi∗t , (20) and (22), (19) is
pi∗t =
1− βω
ω
κθt−1 +
1− βω
ω
(e1 + κe2)(Ψo1Ω
f
t +Ψ
o
2θt−1)
=⇒ pi∗t =
1− βω
ω
(e1 + κe2)Ψo1Ω
f
t +
1− βω
ω
(κ+ (e1 + κe2)Ψo2)θt−1. (16)
Comparing the coefficients of (22) and (23), I obtain
Ao =
1− βω
ω
(e1 + κe2)Ψo1,
Bo =
1− βω
ω
(κ+ (e1 + κe2)Ψo2),
where ei is normal unit vector with i-th element 1. By (22), equilibrium inflation rate is
pit+1 = (1− ω)(AoΩft +Boθt−1). Thus
piθ = (1− ω)Bo.
Put Co = κ−1(e1κ−1 + e2) and EfSθ = Ψo2.
By (7) and (11), in equilibrium, optimal monetary policy rule under discretion is
(1 + τ)(1− ω)BoEcbt−1pit + λ(θt−1 + Ecbt−1vt − Ecbt−1wt) = 0
=⇒ (1 + τ)(1− ω)Bo
[
(1− ω)AoΓcbΩcbt + (1− ω)Boθt−1
]
+ λ(θt−1 + Ecbt−1vt − Ecbt wt) = 0
=⇒ θt−1 = 1
λ+ (1− ω)(1 + τ)(Bo)2
(
λe3 − λe2 − (1 + τ)(1− ω)2BoAo
)
ΓcbΩcbt .
Comparing the coefficients of (20) and (24), I can calculate the undetermined coefficients.
8
8In precise, I first guess the value of Ψ, calculate Ao, Bo and find new value of Ψ. Iterating until
convergence, I obtain the true value of the coefficients.
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Solving the Model under Transparent Regime
The solution method is analogous to that of the opaque regime. Assume that the firms’
belief about monetary policy is
θt−1 = ΘtΓcbΩcbt .
In this regime, firms receive the central bank’s information Ωcbt . Thus, the private sector’s
expectation of the aggregate shock can be written by
EfSt = Ψ
t
(
Ωf
Ωcb
)
.
Firms’ pricing strategy is of the form such as
pi∗t = A
tΩft +D
tΩcbt +B
tθt−1.
Using these equations, by the same way in the opaque regime, I obtain the following
relation:
At = [(1− βω)(e1 + κe2)]Ψt1, Bt =
(1− βω)
ω
,
Kt =
1− βω
ω
(e1 + κe2Ψt2 + βA
tΨt2).
In equilibrium, inflation rate is
pit+1 = (1− ω)(AtΩft +DtΩcbt +Btθt−1).
The first order condition of the discretionary monetary policy has the same form as
before. Hence, eventually, I obtain
θt−1 =
1
λ+ (1− ω)(1 + τ)(Bt)2
[
(1 + τ)λ(e3 − e2) + (1− ω)(Bte4 − (1− ω)Bt(At +Kt(Γcb)−1)
]
ΓcbΩcbt .
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Figure 1: One of the key elements for welfare comparison is the firms’ informational
quality.
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Figure 2: τ ∗∗ = τ ∗ if γf ≤ γ0 and γf > γ1. τ ∗∗ > τ ∗ if γ0 < γf < γ1.
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